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This box reviews the main features and shortcomings of 
insolvency procedures in Spain. These procedures 
generally play an important role in the development of 
business activity, since they allow insolvent but viable 
firms, whose debt needs to be restructured, to be 
distinguished from unviable firms that need to be 
liquidated.  International evidence1 shows that the 
existence of an efficient insolvency system helps to raise 
aggregate productivity, the rate of innovation and 
business investment. In addition, soundly functioning 
insolvency mechanisms support the intermediation 
activity of banks as they make it easier for them to recover 
part of their unpaid loans. Finally, the correct functioning 
of bankruptcy procedures for individuals encourages 
entrepreneurship: sole proprietors will be less concerned 
about the possibility of failure, since part of their debts 
can be discharged. 
In Spain, pre-insolvency and insolvency procedures are 
governed by the Insolvency Law approved in 2003, which 
came into force on 1 September 2004.2 However, the 
increase in insolvency proceedings as a result of the 
global financial crisis laid bare various malfunctions in the 
system, which led to six reforms of the Insolvency Law in 
the period 2009-2015. These procedures can also be 
used by consumers, although this box focuses on firms 
and the self-employed. Figure 1 shows the various pre-
insolvency and insolvency procedures according to the 
type of firm involved.
The aim of insolvency proceedings is to resolve a situation 
of insolvency via one of two channels: a restructuring 
agreement or liquidation. A restructuring agreement is an 
agreement between creditors and the debtor company, 
which includes a debt restructuring seeking to ensure 
that lenders recover the highest possible proportion of 
their claims and that the firm continues to operate. The 
agreement may envisage a reduction in the nominal 
amount of the debt, a deferral (postponement of the 
scheduled payments), a debt-equity swap and 
assignment of assets and rights in payment of debt. Such 
agreements must have the backing of the majority of 
unsecured credit. A liquidation involves the sale of a 
firm’s assets to pay its creditors in accordance with a 
certain order of priority of claims.
In addition, there are two types of pre-insolvency 
arrangements, which aim to resolve insolvency problems 
that are detected early: out-of-court payment agreements 
for individuals and small firms; and refinancing 
agreements, which are used predominantly by firms of a 
certain size. The latter include a variant – court-approved 
refinancing agreements – that offers greater protection to 
the debtor firm.
Lastly, in the case of individuals, whether self-employed 
or owners of small businesses, there are two insolvency 
channels: immediate discharge of debt following 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets; and the fresh-start 
mechanism, which consists of a five-year repayment plan 
ending with discharge of all other debts. 
By international standards, very limited use has been 
made of insolvency proceedings in Spain, even during 
economic crises. This is mainly explained by the low use 
of these procedures by the self-employed and microfirms 
(firms that employ fewer than 10 persons), which make up 
the bulk of the productive system in Spain. In the case of 
the self-employed, in 2019 there were 2 insolvency 
proceedings for every 10,000 self-employed persons in 
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Spain, as against 32 in France and 74 in England and 
Wales. As regards microfirms, in 2019 there were 9.5 
insolvency proceedings for every 10,000 Spanish 
microfirms, as against 105 in France.3
This limited use of insolvency proceedings in Spain is 
essentially for two reasons: (i) the inefficiency of the 
insolvency system, reflected in how slow the proceedings 
are (with an average duration of 3-4 years),4 which is a 
result, at least in part, of congestion in the commercial 
courts; and (ii) the lack of appeal that the system has for 
individuals, considering how difficult it is to obtain a 
discharge of debts. In particular, public claims (essentially 
taxes and social security contributions) cannot be 
discharged and usually make up a significant part of the 
debt of microfirms and the self-employed. Also, some 
experts stress that the repayment plan of the fresh-start 
mechanism is excessively long (five years), although the 
transposition of the EU Insolvency Directive5 should 
reduce the duration of the repayment plan to a maximum 
of three years. Lastly, a further deterrent is the fact that 
the cost of the proceedings (legal costs, remuneration for 
insolvency administrators and lawyers) is high and largely 
fixed or not sufficiently dependent on the amount of the 
firm’s debt or assets. In consequence, and given the 
stigma that may result from using pre-insolvency and 
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— Pre-insolvency: out-of-court payment agreement
— Insolvency proceedings
— Subsequent insolvency proceedings:





PRE-INSOLVENCY ARRANGEMENTS AND INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS FOR NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS AND SOLE PROPRIETORS
— Pre-insolvency: out-of-court payment agreement
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insolvency procedures,6 firms generally use insolvency 
proceedings only as a last resort. This means that the 
great majority of proceedings end in liquidation,7 because 
when firms file for insolvency their financial situation is 
already extremely vulnerable.  
Finally, as regards pre-insolvency arrangements, 
refinancing agreements seem to be performing their 
function of providing an alternative mechanism to 
insolvency proceedings for firms of a certain size. 
Conversely, the limited use of out-of-court payment 
agreements shows that they are not attractive for the 
self-employed and owners of small businesses.8 
According to some experts,9 there are two reasons for 
this. First, negotiation of the debt with public creditors is 
beyond the scope of out-of-court payment agreements. 
Second, the economic incentives for possible mediators 
to recommend an out-of-court payment agreement to 
potential beneficiaries are generally limited since the 
remuneration is usually very low, and consequently most 
do not recommend them and do not inform debtors of 
the existence of this procedure. In this context, some 
analysts10 have proposed various ways of promoting the 
participation and performance of the professionals 
involved in pre-insolvency and insolvency procedures, by 
for example increasing the remuneration of insolvency 
mediators entrusted with managing and negotiating out-
of-court payment agreements, guaranteeing the 
remuneration of insolvency administrators and 
broadening the scope of application of justice provided 
free of charge (the turno de oficio system) to the area of 
insolvency.
 6  M. A. McGowan and D. Andrews, (2018): "Design of insolvency regimes across countries"; OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1504.
 7  93% according to M. García-Posada and R. Vegas (2018), “Bankruptcy reforms in the midst of the Great Recession: the Spanish Experience”, 
International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 55, September 2018, pp 71–95.
 8  According to Van Hemmen (2020a), between 1 March 2015 and 31 March 2020 only 93 out-of-court payment agreements were initiated. E. Van 
Hemmen (2020a), Estadística concursal. Anuario 2019, Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y de lo Mercantil de España, Madrid.
 9 S. Van Hemmen (2020b), “Acompañando la segunda oportunidad”, Anuario de Derecho Concursal, No 50.
10  M. Celentani and F. Gómez Pomar (2020). “Concursos y pre-concursos de personas físicas, autónomos y microempresas: déjà vu all over again”, 
InDret 3/2020.
